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Citizen candidates under uncertainty

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  • Eguia, Jon X.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Eguia, Jon X., 2005. "Citizen candidates under uncertainty," Working Papers 1233, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1233
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1233.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    2. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2011. "Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(1), pages 83-104, January.
    2. repec:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201712)173:4_565:ppasci_2.0.tx_2-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Saporiti, Alejandro, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    4. Yuelan Chen & Aihua Xia, 2011. "The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 471-492, September.
    5. Bagh, Adib, 2014. "Candidates' Uncertainty and Error Distribution Models in Electoral Competitions," MPRA Paper 77631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
    7. Alejandro Saporiti, 2006. "Strategic voting on single-crossing domains," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0617, Economics, The University of Manchester.

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    Keywords

    citizen candidates; uncertainty; strategic voting; sincere voting;

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