IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v37y2011i3p471-492.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population

Author

Listed:
  • Yuelan Chen
  • Aihua Xia

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuelan Chen & Aihua Xia, 2011. "The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 471-492, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:471-492
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0500-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-010-0500-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00355-010-0500-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milchtaich, Igal, 2004. "Random-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-388, May.
    2. Jon Eguia, 2007. "Citizen candidates under uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 317-331, September.
    3. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
    5. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
    6. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
    7. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hughes, Niall, 2016. "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
    2. Bouton, Laurent & Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    3. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2022. "Poisson voting games under proportional rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 507-526, April.
    4. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 360-385, September.
    5. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2012. "Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 681-700.
    6. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
    7. Kets, W., 2008. "Beliefs in Network Games (Revised version of CentER DP 2007-46)," Other publications TiSEM a08e38fd-6b00-4233-94ce-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Martin Gregor, 2013. "The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp493, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    9. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Ferraris, Leo & Meroni, Claudia, 2024. "Poisson Search," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    10. Laurent Bouto & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Fédéric Malherbe, 2014. "Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power," Working Papers 722, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
    12. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.
    13. Spenkuch, Jörg, 2013. "On the Extent of Strategic Voting," MPRA Paper 50198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Matías Núñez & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 346-374, April.
    15. Ritzberger, Klaus, 2009. "Price competition with population uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 145-157, September.
    16. Laurent Bouto & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Fédéric Malherbe, 2014. "Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power," Working Papers 722, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    17. Matias Nunez & Laslier Jean François Author-Workplace-Name : Ecole Polytechnique, 2010. "Overstating: A tale of two cities," THEMA Working Papers 2010-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    18. Kets, W., 2008. "Networks and learning in game theory," Other publications TiSEM 7713fce1-3131-498c-8c6f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2019. "Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games," PSE Working Papers halshs-02049865, HAL.
    20. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:471-492. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.