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On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players

Listed author(s):
  • Pierre Bernhard

    ()

    (INRIA-Sophia Antipolis Méditerranée)

  • Marc Deschamps

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté)

Abstract We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game. As illustrations, we discuss some examples relating to oligopoly theory (Cournot, Stackelberg, cartel).

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File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-016-0197-z
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Dynamic Games and Applications.

Volume (Year): 7 (2017)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 360-385

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Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0197-z
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0197-z
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

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