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Poisson voting games: proportional rule

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    () (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Claudia Meroni

    () (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

Abstract

We analyze strategic voting under pure proportional rule and two candidates, embedding the basic spatial model into the Poisson framework of population uncertainty. We prove that the Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. We show that it is characterized by a cutpoint in the policy space that is always located between the mean of the two candidates’ positions and the median of the distribution of voters’ types. We also show that, as the expected number of voters goes to infinity, the equilibrium converges to that of the complete information case.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2019. "Poisson voting games: proportional rule," Working Papers 11/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:11/2019
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    File URL: http://dse.univr.it/home/workingpapers/wp2019n11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2007. "Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 155-200, January.
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    3. Makris, Miltiadis, 2009. "Private provision of discrete public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 292-299, September.
    4. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    5. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
    6. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2011. "Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(2), pages 183-211.
    7. Meroni, Claudia, 2017. "Electoral competition with strategic voters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 64-66.
    8. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
    9. Makris, Miltiadis, 2008. "Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 180-189, January.
    10. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
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    12. repec:ulb:ulbeco:2013/162238 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Thomas Palfrey, 2014. "Turnout and Power Sharing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(574), pages 131-162, February.
    14. repec:wly:amposc:v:60:y:2016:i:4:p:1026-1043 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Ritzberger, Klaus, 2009. "Price competition with population uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 145-157, September.
    16. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2012. "Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2083-2123.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Poisson games; strategic voting; proportional rule;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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