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Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums

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  • Maniquet, François; Morelli, Massimo

Abstract

We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters' participation is often among the desiderata by the election designer. A participation quorum is a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below which the status quo is kept. We show that participation quorums produce incentive for partisans of the status quo to abstain, with the consequence that the status quo may be kept in situations where the planner would prefer the reform, or the reform is passed when the planner prefers the status quo. An approval quorum is a threshold on the number of voters expressing a ballot in favor of the reform below which the status quo is kept. We show that approval quorums do not suffer from the drawbacks of participation quorums. Moreover, an electoral system with approval quorum performs better than one with participation quorum even when the planner wishes to implement the corresponding participation quorum social choice function.

Suggested Citation

  • Maniquet, François; Morelli, Massimo, 2010. "Approval Quorums Dominate Participation Quorums," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/13, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2010/13
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    Cited by:

    1. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.
    2. Grüner, Hans Peter & Tröger, Thomas, 2018. "Linear voting rules," Working Papers 18-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    3. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 431-454, March.
    4. Artabe, Alaitz & Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2011. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," IKERLANAK 2011-48, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    5. Rolando Herrero, 2017. "Integrating HEC with circuit breakers and multipath RTP to improve RTC media quality," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 211-221, January.
    6. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
    7. Marc Pauly, 2013. "Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 581-597.

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    Keywords

    Proportional Influence; Winner-Take-All; Underdog Compensation;

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