Preferences, actions and voting rules
In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up - which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for manipulability (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.
|Date of creation:||17 Jan 2011|
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain|
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