Majorities with a quorum
Based on a general model of "quaternary" voting rule, sensitive to voters' choices between four different options (abstaining, voting "yes", voting "no" and staying home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible combinations of a majority system with a type of quorum and provide examples from rules actually used in parliaments.
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- Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, 2003. "Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 399-431, December.
- Valenciano Llovera, Federico & Laruelle, Annick, 2010.
"Quaternary dichotomous voting rules,"
2010-41, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521873871 is not listed on IDEAS
- Paulo P. Corte-Real & Paulo Trigo Pereira, 2002.
"The voter who wasn't there: Referenda, Representation and Abstention,"
Working Papers Department of Economics
2002/04, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
- Paulo P. Côrte-Real & Paulo T. Pereira, 2004. "The voter who wasn’t there: Referenda, representation and abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 349-369, 04.
- Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2010. "The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 85-122, January.
- Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S., 2009. "Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 428-444, November.
- MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351.
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