A Policy-Based Rationalization of Collective Rules: Dimensionality, Specialized Houses, and Decentralized Authority
We offer a policy basis for interpreting, justifying, and designing (3,3)-political rules, a large class of collective rules analogous to those governing the selection of papers in peer-reviewed journals, where each referee chooses to accept, reject, or invite a resubmission of a paper, and an editor aggregates his own and referees' opinions into one of these three recommendations. We prove that any such rule is a weighted multicameral rule: a policy is collectively approved at a given level if and only if it is approved by a minimal number of chambers- the dimension of the rule-, where each chamber evaluates a different aspect of the policy using a weighted rule, with each evaluator's weight or authority possibly varying across chambers depending on his area(s) of expertise. Conversely, it is always possible to design a rule under which a policy is collectively approved at a given level if and only if it meets a certain number of predefined criteria, so that one can set the standards for policies first, and then design the rules that justify the passage of policies meeting those standards. These results imply that a given rule is only suitable for evaluating finite-dimensional policies whose dimension corresponds to that of the rule, and they provide a rationale for using different rules to pass different policies even within the same organization. We further introduce the concept of compatibility with a rule, and use it to propose a method to construct integer weights corresponding to evaluators' possible judgments under a given rule, which are more intuitive and easier to interpret for policymakers. Our findings shed light on multicameralism in political institutions and multi-criteria group decision-making in the firm. We provide applications to peer review politics, rating systems, and real-world organizations.
|Date of creation:||09 Apr 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
- Tchantcho, Bertrand & Lambo, Lawrence Diffo & Pongou, Roland & Engoulou, Bertrand Mbama, 2008. "Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 335-350, September.
- Taylor Alan & Zwicker William, 1993. "Weighted Voting, Multicameral Representation, and Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 170-181, January.
- Dennis Leech, 2003. "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(6), pages 831-837, June.
- Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-61, January.
- Valenciano Llovera, Federico & Laruelle, Annick, 2010.
"Quaternary dichotomous voting rules,"
2010-41, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Roland Pongou & Bertrand Tchantcho & Lawrence Diffo Lambo, 2011.
"Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 157-178, February.
- Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Diffo Lambo, Lawrence, 2008. "Political Influence in Multi-Choice Institutions: Cyclicity, Anonymity and Transitivity," MPRA Paper 18240, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2009.
- Leech, Dennis, 1985.
"The relationshiop between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies : A study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
267, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Dennis Leech, 1988. "The Relationship Between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 509-527, April.
- Freixas, Josep & Puente, Maria Albina, 2008. "Dimension of complete simple games with minimum," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 188(2), pages 555-568, July.
- Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S., 2009. "Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 428-444, November.
- Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
- Deineko, Vladimir G. & Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2006. "On the dimension of simple monotonic games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 170(1), pages 315-318, April.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521873871 is not listed on IDEAS
- Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, 2003. "Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 399-431, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.