The relationshiop between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies : A study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games
The relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power and the question of corporate control has long been recognised as being of central importance in the economies of the firm and has given rise to a large literature. Despite this, however, and the fact that quite sharp differences in perspective exist in this literature, relatively little work has been done on actually attempting to measure, in a theoretically rigorous way, the quantitative significance of empirically observed differences in concentration on the distribution of power.
|Date of creation:||1985|
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- Leech, Dennis, 1985. "Ownership Concentration and the Theory of the Firm : A Simple-Game-Theoretic Approach to Applied US Corporations in the 1930's," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 262, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Guillermo Owen, 1972. "Multilinear Extensions of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 64-79, January.
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