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Some conjectures on the two main power indices

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrice Barthelemy

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Mathieu Martin

    () (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Bertrand Tchantcho

    () (University of Yaounde I, Ecole Normale Superieure, Cameroon, PO Box 47 Yaounde)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to present a structural specification of the Shapley- Shubik and Banzhaf power indices in a weighted voting rule. We compare them in term of the cardinality of the sets of power vectors (PV). This is done in different situations where the quota or the number of seats are fixed or not.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Barthelemy & Mathieu Martin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2011. "Some conjectures on the two main power indices," THEMA Working Papers 2011-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2011-14
    as

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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2011-14.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laruelle,Annick & Valenciano,Federico, 2011. "Voting and Collective Decision-Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521182638, December.
    2. Guillermo Owen, 1972. "Multilinear Extensions of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 64-79.
    3. Dennis Leech, 2003. "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 831-837.
    4. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
    5. Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Joël Moulen, 2002. "Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 313-325.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-464, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shapley-Shubik; Banzhaf; power index; power vectors.;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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