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Vaccine and Inclusion

Author

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  • Zéphirin Nganmeni
  • Roland Pongou
  • Bertrand Tchantcho
  • Jean-Baptiste Tondji

Abstract

In majoritarian democracies, popular policies may not be inclusive, and inclusive policies may not be popular. This dilemma raises the crucial question of when it is possible to design a policy that is both inclusive and popular. We address this question in the context of vaccine allocation in a polarized economy facing a pandemic. In such an economy, individuals are organized around distinct networks and groups and have in-group preferences. We provide a complete characterization of the set of inclusive and popular vaccine allocations. The findings imply that the number of vaccine doses necessary to generate an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation is greater than the one necessary to obtain an allocation that is only popular. The analysis further reveals that it is always possible to design the decision-making rule of the economy to implement an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation. Under such a rule, the composition of any group endowed with the veto power should necessarily reflect the diversity of the society.

Suggested Citation

  • Zéphirin Nganmeni & Roland Pongou & Bertrand Tchantcho & Jean-Baptiste Tondji, 2022. "Vaccine and Inclusion," Working Papers 2202E Classification-C62,, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ott:wpaper:2202e
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    2. Alexis Roussel & Romain Biard & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss, 2023. "Modeling medical material shortage using Markov processes," Working Papers 2023-04, CRESE.
    3. Pongou, Roland & Sidie, Ghislain Junior & Tchuente, Guy & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2022. "Profits, Pandemics, and Lockdown Effectiveness in Nursing Home Networks," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1131, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    4. Camacho, Carmen & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, 2023. "Transmissible Diseases, Vaccination and Inequality," IZA Discussion Papers 16504, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Rabah Amir & Raouf Boucekkine, 2022. "Introduction to the special issue on new insights into economic epidemiology: Theory and policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(5), pages 861-872, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fertility; Inclusive vaccine policy; Leader popularity; Voting rule; Polarization; Social networks; In-group preferences; Minorities.;
    All these keywords.

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