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Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power

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  • Laurent Bouton
  • Aniol Llorente-Saguer
  • Frédéric Malherbe

Abstract

A group of agents wants to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We analyze a simple voting system - majority rule with veto power (Veto) - that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in the EU institutions and could help to inform debates about policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Frédéric Malherbe, 2014. "Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power," NBER Working Papers 20417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20417
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Malherbe, Frédéric, 2017. "Unanimous rules in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 179-198.
    3. Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2018. "On the Weights of Sovereign Nations," Working Papers halshs-01630090, HAL.

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    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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