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Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results

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  • Cesar Martinelli

    () (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Thomas R. Palfrey

    () (Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology)

Abstract

We survey selectively lab experiments on voting games including pre-play activities such as communication and other forms of information release. We focus on a few areas that have received much attention in the last few decades, including costly voting and other collective action problems, coordination in elections with more than two alternatives, electoral competition and democratic accountability with imperfect Information, and legislative bargaining. We identify three forces that appear to be operating when communication is allowed: equilibrium, efficiency, and (underlying both) coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1065
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    Cited by:

    1. Kwiek, Maksymilian & Marreiros, Helia & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2019. "Voting as a war of attrition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 104-121.
    2. Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto, 2019. "When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 52-64.
    3. Pogorelskiy, Kirill & Shum, Matthew, 2019. "News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 427, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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