Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms
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- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2007. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(03), pages 409-424, August.
- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2005. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," Papers 09-19-2005c, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2005. "Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey, 2005. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," Working Papers 81, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2006. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000205, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010.
"Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 771-798, October.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests," MPRA Paper 49887, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two- Stage Political Contests," Working Papers 09-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Marco Battaglini & Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2010.
"The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 61-89.
- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2005. "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory," Papers 03-13-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "The Swing Voter’s Curse in the laboratory," Working Papers 1263, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2006. "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory," CEPR Discussion Papers 5458, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marci Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey, 2007. "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory," Working Papers 0019, New York University, Center for Experimental Social Science.
- Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey, 2005. "The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000914, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Marco Battaglini & Rebecca Morton & Thomas Palfrey, 2007. "The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000760, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Morton, Rebecca B. & Muller, Daniel & Page, Lionel & Torgler, Benno, 2015.
"Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 65-81.
- Rebecca B. Morton & Daniel Mueller & Lionel Page & Benno Torgler, 2013. "Exit Polls, Turnout, and Bandwagon Voting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," QuBE Working Papers 008, QUT Business School.
- Rebecca B. Morton & Daniel Müller & Lionel Page & Benno Torgler, 2013. "Exit Polls, Turnout, and Bandwagon Voting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CREMA Working Paper Series 2013-01, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Zeynep B. Irfanoglu & Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests," Working Papers 14-15, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Irfanoglu, Zeynep & Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests," MPRA Paper 67520, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Esteban F. Klory & Eyal Winter, 2006.
"On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
321307000000000451, David K. Levine.
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"Conclave,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 258-275.
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- Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2015. "What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 224-241.
- Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2011. "Seeking Harmony Amidst Diversity: Consensus Building with Network Externalities," ISER Discussion Paper 0826, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Dino Gerardi & Margaret A. McConnell & Julian Romero & Leeat Yariv, 2016. "Get Out The (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design For Greater Participation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1963-1979, October.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Maria Vittoria Levati & Ivan Soraperra, 2016. "Electing a parliament: an experimental study," Working Papers 11/2016, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
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Econometrica,
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- Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2013. "The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-209, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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- Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman, 2018. "New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests," MPRA Paper 85337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2006-12-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CFN-2006-12-22 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-EXP-2006-12-22 (Experimental Economics)
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