Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections
We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all sequential structures. We also explore the relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting in other contexts. We illustrate several instances where sequential voting does no better at aggregating information than simultaneous voting. The inability of the sequential structure to use additional information in voting models is distinct from that in the herd-cascade literature.
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- Hillier, G. & Armstrong, M., 1996. "On the density of the maximum likelihood estimator," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9645, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Grant Hillier & Mark Armstrong, 1999. "The Density of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(6), pages 1459-1470, November.
- Shephard, Neil, 1993. "Distribution of the ML Estimator of an MA(1) and a local level model," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(03), pages 377-401, June.
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