IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/61288.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The strategic dis/advantage of voting early

Author

Listed:
  • Dekel, Eddie
  • Piccione, Michele

Abstract

Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting).

Suggested Citation

  • Dekel, Eddie & Piccione, Michele, 2014. "The strategic dis/advantage of voting early," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61288, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:61288
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61288/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2007. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 409-424, August.
    2. Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 2000. "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 34-55, February.
    3. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2010. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1110-1150.
    4. S. Ali & Navin Kartik, 2012. "Herding with collective preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 601-626, November.
    5. Morton, Rebecca B. & Williams, Kenneth C., 1999. "Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 51-67, March.
    6. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
    7. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Sequential voting with abstention," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 445-463, May.
    8. Sloth Birgitte, 1993. "The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 152-169, January.
    9. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mats Ekman, 2022. "Advance voting and political competition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 53-66, March.
    2. Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2023. "Large elections and interim turnout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 175-210.
    3. Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal, 2020. "Social Influence in Legal Deliberations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 999, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 12 Sep 2021.
    4. Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal, 2024. "Social influence in committee deliberation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 185-207, March.
    5. Kendall, Ryan, 2021. "Sequential competitions with a middle-mover advantage," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    6. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2022. "Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 317-344, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Patrick Hummel & Brian Knight, 2015. "Sequential Or Simultaneous Elections? A Welfare Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(3), pages 851-887, August.
    2. Hummel, Patrick & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Optimal primaries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 64-75.
    3. Hummel, Patrick, 2012. "Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 341-348.
    4. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2010. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1110-1150.
    5. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Omer Tamuz & Ivo Welch, 2024. "Information Cascades and Social Learning," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1040-1093, September.
    6. Rainer Schwabe, 2015. "Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 927-951, April.
    7. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2007. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 409-424, August.
    8. Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, January.
    9. Morton, Rebecca B. & Muller, Daniel & Page, Lionel & Torgler, Benno, 2015. "Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 65-81.
    10. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 13921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. repec:pri:cepsud:121palfrey is not listed on IDEAS
    12. González-Díaz, Julio & Herold, Florian & Domínguez, Diego, 2016. "Strategic sequential voting," BERG Working Paper Series 113, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    13. Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2022. "Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 317-344, March.
    14. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1447-1454.
    15. Iaryczower, Matias, 2007. "Strategic voting in sequential committees," Working Papers 1275, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    16. Deniz Selman, 2011. "Optimal Sequencing of Presidential Primaries," Working Papers 2011/09, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    17. Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt & Katri K. Sieberg & Beth A. Freeborn, 2022. "An Experimental Study of Strategic Voting and Accuracy of Verdicts with Sequential and Simultaneous Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-28, March.
    18. Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2015. "What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 224-241.
    19. Eyster, Erik & Galeotti, Andrea & Kartik, Navin & Rabin, Matthew, 2014. "Congested observational learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 519-538.
    20. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2015. "Do polls create momentum in political competition?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-14.
    21. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Dynamic Campaign Spending," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 601, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:61288. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.