IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v96y2012i3p341-348.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates

Author

Listed:
  • Hummel, Patrick

Abstract

I analyze strategic voting incentives in large elections with three candidates when voting takes place sequentially. Voters have perfect information about their private preferences but do not know the distribution from which other voters' preferences are drawn. If a candidate finishes last in an early voting round, voters deduce that this candidate is likely to be less popular amongst the remaining voters, and the remaining voters almost always have an incentive to stop voting for this candidate. By contrast, sincere voting equilibria can exist under either simultaneous voting or an early voting round of sequential voting without knife-edge assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hummel, Patrick, 2012. "Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 341-348.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:3:p:341-348
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.12.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004727271100171X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:101:y:2007:i:03:p:409-424_07 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:03:p:804-815_22 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Patrick Hummel, 2011. "Sequential Voting When Long Elections Are Costly," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 36-58, March.
    4. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Palfrey, Thomas, 2007. "Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(03), pages 409-424, August.
    5. Brian Knight & Nathan Schiff, 2010. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1110-1150.
    6. Micael Castanheira, 2003. "Why Vote For Losers?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1207-1238, September.
    7. Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August.
    8. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
    9. Thomas Piketty, 2000. "Voting as Communicating," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 169-191.
    10. Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2009. "Manipulation through political endorsements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1227-1248, May.
    11. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Sequential voting with abstention," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 445-463, May.
    12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:cup:apsrev:v:74:y:1980:i:03:p:651-669_16 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Richard Bensel & M. Sanders, 1979. "The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 69-85, March.
    15. repec:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:01:p:51-67_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Strumpf, Koleman S, 2002. "Strategic Competition in Sequential Election Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(3-4), pages 377-397, June.
    17. Chamberlain, Gary & Rothschild, Michael, 1981. "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 152-162, August.
    18. Johnston, R. J. & Pattie, C. J., 1991. "Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(01), pages 95-108, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Hummel, 2014. "Pre-election polling and third party candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 77-98, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Strategic voting; Multiple candidates; Sequential voting; Simultaneous voting;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:3:p:341-348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.