Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting
In this paper I show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1. These bandwagons are driven by a combination of beliefs and the desire of voters to vote for the winning candidate. Significantly, in this equilibrium the pivot probability for each voter is non-zero, even in an infinite population. Consequently, the bandwagons do not always start after one (or at most two) favourable decisions (as do economic cascades) and varying levels of informative voting are observed, consistent with observations from sequential voting in U.S. presidential primaries. Further, voters are exposed to counterintuitive incentives, referred to as “buyers' remorse”, that have been attributed to real primary voters.I also derive equilibrium behaviour in this environment when voting is simultaneous and compare the quality of information aggregation within each mechanism. I relate the conclusions to U.S. presidential primaries and find they are consistent with a common conclusion about the front-loading of the primary process: that in tight elections (with no front-runner) simultaneous voting is preferred, whereas in lopsided elections sequential voting is preferred. The superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.
Volume (Year): 74 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:3:p:653-684. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.