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Costly Voting

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  • Tilman Börgers

Abstract

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Paretodominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.
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  • Tilman Börgers, 2001. "Costly Voting," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000232, www.najecon.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000232
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