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Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Turner, Matthew
  • Weninger, Quinn

Abstract

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, “meetings with costly participation”, (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries.

Suggested Citation

  • Turner, Matthew & Weninger, Quinn, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis," ISU General Staff Papers 200501010800001401, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:200501010800001401
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    Cited by:

    1. Quinn Weninger, 2008. "Economic Benefits of Management Reform in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper Fishery: A Semi-parametric Analysis," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(4), pages 479-497, December.
    2. Sanz, Carlos, 2020. "Direct democracy and government size: evidence from Spain," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 630-645, October.
    3. R. Quentin Grafton & Ragnar Arnason & Trond Bjorndal & David Campbell & Harry F. Campbell & Colin W. Clark & Robin Connor & Diane P. Dupont & Rognvaldur Hannesson & Ray Hilborn & James E. Kirkley & To, 2005. "Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries (now replaced by EEN0508)," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 0501, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
    4. Lynham, John, 2014. "How have catch shares been allocated?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 42-48.
    5. Shuang Liu & Kirsten Maclean & Cathy Robinson, 2019. "A cost-effective framework to prioritise stakeholder participation options," EURO Journal on Decision Processes, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 7(3), pages 221-241, November.
    6. Leah Brooks & Justin Phillips & Maxim Sinitsyn, 2011. "The Cabals of a Few or the Confusion of a Multitude: The Institutional Trade-Off between Representation and Governance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 1-24, February.
    7. Dale Squires & Yongil Jeon & R. Quentin Grafton & James Kirkley, 2010. "Controlling excess capacity in common-pool resource industries: the transition from input to output controls ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 361-377, July.
    8. Cuttner, Allison K. & Hübert, Ryan & Montagnes, Brendan Pablo, 2024. "The Public Meeting Paradox: How NIMBY-Dominated Public Meetings Can Enable New Housing," OSF Preprints gfbva, Center for Open Science.
    9. Holzer, Jorge & DePiper, Geret & Brooks, Elizabeth N., 2025. "Observability and stakeholder conflict in resources management," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    10. Freeman, Matthew A. & Anderson, Christopher M., 2017. "Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 123-129.
    11. Holzer, Jorge & McConnell, Kenneth, 2023. "Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    12. Sophal Chhun & Viktoria Kahui & Henrik Moller & Paul Thorsnes, 2015. "Advancing Marine Policy Toward Ecosystem-Based Management by Eliciting Public Preferences," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 261-275.
    13. Takanori Adachi, 2004. "Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention: a uniqueness result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(2), pages 1-5.
    14. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
    15. Saiz, Albert, 2011. "The median voter didn't show up: Costly meetings and insider rents," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 415-425, September.
    16. Gábor Virág, 2008. "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two‐Party Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 891-922, October.
    17. Smith, Martin D. & Zhang, Junjie & Coleman, Felicia C., 2008. "Econometric modeling of fisheries with complex life histories: Avoiding biological management failures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 265-280, May.
    18. Roy, Sunanda & Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2023. "Entry under placement uncertainty," ISU General Staff Papers 202102240800001096, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    19. Yates, K.L., 2014. "View from the wheelhouse: Perceptions on marine management from the fishing community and suggestions for improvement," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 39-50.
    20. Valérie Barraud-Didier & Marie-Christine Henninger & Pierre Triboulet, 2014. "La Participation des Adhérents Dans Leurs Coopératives Agricoles: Une Étude Exploratoire du Secteur Céréalier Français," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 62(1), pages 125-148, March.
    21. repec:osf:osfxxx:gfbva_v1 is not listed on IDEAS

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