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Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Turner, Matthew
  • Weninger, Quinn

Abstract

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results; (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, 'meetings with costly participation', (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in US fisheries.

Suggested Citation

  • Turner, Matthew & Weninger, Quinn, 2005. "Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11464, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:11464
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    Cited by:

    1. Sophal Chhun & Viktoria Kahui & Henrik Moller & Paul Thorsnes, 2015. "Advancing Marine Policy Toward Ecosystem-Based Management by Eliciting Public Preferences," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, pages 261-275.
    2. R. Quentin Grafton & Ragnar Arnason & Trond Bjorndal & David Campbell & Harry F. Campbell & Colin W. Clark & Robin Connor & Diane P. Dupont & Rognvaldur Hannesson & Ray Hilborn & James E. Kirkley & To, 2005. "Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries (now replaced by EEN0508)," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 0501, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
    3. Takanori Adachi, 2004. "Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention: a uniqueness result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(2), pages 1-5.
    4. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 57-66.
    5. John Lynham, 2012. "How Have Catch Shares Been Allocated?," Working Papers 201219, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    6. Leah Brooks & Justin Phillips & Maxim Sinitsyn, 2011. "The Cabals of a Few or the Confusion of a Multitude: The Institutional Trade-Off between Representation and Governance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, pages 1-24.
    7. Saiz, Albert, 2011. "The median voter didn't show up: Costly meetings and insider rents," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 415-425, September.
    8. Dale Squires & Yongil Jeon & R. Quentin Grafton & James Kirkley, 2010. "Controlling excess capacity in common-pool resource industries: the transition from input to output controls ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, pages 361-377.
    9. Smith, Martin D. & Zhang, Junjie & Coleman, Felicia C., 2008. "Econometric modeling of fisheries with complex life histories: Avoiding biological management failures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 265-280, May.
    10. Lynham, John, 2014. "How have catch shares been allocated?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, pages 42-48.
    11. Freeman, Matthew A. & Anderson, Christopher M., 2017. "Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 123-129.
    12. Lynham, John, 2014. "How have catch shares been allocated?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, pages 42-48.
    13. Yates, K.L., 2014. "View from the wheelhouse: Perceptions on marine management from the fishing community and suggestions for improvement," Marine Policy, Elsevier, pages 39-50.

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