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Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay

Listed author(s):
  • Ando, Amy Whritenour

This paper uses duration analysis to evaluate the ability of interest groups to influence the timing of decisions to add species to the endangered species list by exerting pressure on the Fish and Wildlife Service. Using data from 1990 to 1994, it finds that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten, respectively, the progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under the agency's control. Since the Service is not an atypical agency, similar patterns of public influence on delay may exist in other areas of bureaucratic decision making as well. Copyright 1999 by the University of Chicago.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467417
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 29-60

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:42:y:1999:i:1:p:29-60
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/

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  1. Heckman, James & Singer, Burton, 1984. "A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 271-320, March.
  2. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-782, July.
  3. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-679, June.
  4. Han, Aaron & Hausman, Jerry A, 1990. "Flexible Parametric Estimation of Duration and Competing Risk Models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(1), pages 1-28, January-M.
  5. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
  6. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
  7. Benjamin M. Simon & Craig S. Leff & Harvey Doerksen, 1995. "Allocating scarce resources for endangered species recovery," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(3), pages 415-432.
  8. Fiorina, Morris P. & Noll, Roger G., 1978. "Voters, bureaucrats and legislators : A rational choice perspective on the growth of bureaucracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 239-254, April.
  9. Lillard, Lee A., 1993. "Simultaneous equations for hazards : Marriage duration and fertility timing," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1-2), pages 189-217, March.
  10. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
  11. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
  12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:03:p:755-774_22 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Lacy Glenn Thomas, 1988. "Revealed Bureaucratic Preference: Priorities of the Consumer Product Safety Commission," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 102-113, Spring.
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