IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/itse17/169478.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Communications Act 2021

Author

Listed:
  • Lehr, William
  • Sicker, Douglas

Abstract

The Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is showing its age.1 Like an old New England house that added drafty new additions over the years to accommodate a growing extended family, the Act is poorly suited to meet today's challenges. Much of what is included in the Act relates to earlier technologies, market structures, and regulatory constructs that address issues that are either no longer relevant or that cause confusion when one tries to map them to current circumstances. The legacy Act was crafted in a world of circuit-switched POTS2 telephony provided by public utilities, and even when substantially revised in 1996, barely mentions broadband or the Internet.3 Moreover, the FCC has struggled in recent years to establish its authority to regulate broadband services and in its effort to craft a framework to protect an Open Internet (sometimes, referred to as Network Neutrality). While many of the fundamental concerns that the legacy Act addressed remain core concerns for public policy, the technology, market, and policy environment are substantially changed. For example, we believe that universal access to broadband and Internet services is an important policy goal, but do not believe that the current framework enshrined in Title II of the legacy Act does a good job of advancing those goals. Additionally, spectrum policy within the FCC is too closely mired in legacy decisions that blend management of scarce spectrum resources with media content considerations4 and industrial policy. In this paper, we identify the key concerns that a new Act should address and those issues in the legacy Act that may be of diminished importance. We propose a list of the key Titles that a new Communications Act of 2021 might include and identify their critical provisions. Our straw man proposal includes six titles: Title I establishes the basic goals of the Act and sets forth the scope and authority for the FCC; Title II provides the basic framework for regulating potential bottlenecks; Title III establishes a framework for monitoring the performance of communications markets, for addressing market failures, and for promoting industrial policy goals; Title IV focuses on managing radio-frequency spectrum; Title V focuses on public safety and critical infrastructure; and Title VI addresses the transition plan. Our goal is to provoke a discussion about what a new Act might look like in an ideal, clean-slate world; not to address the political, procedural, or legal challenges that necessarily would confront any attempt at major reform. That such challenges are daunting we take as given and as a partial explanation for why the legacy Act has survived so long. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile having a clear picture of what a new Communications Act should include and the benefits that having a new Act might offer so we can better judge what our priorities ought to be and what reforms might best be attempted.

Suggested Citation

  • Lehr, William & Sicker, Douglas, 2017. "Communications Act 2021," 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017 169478, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itse17:169478
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/169478/1/Lehr-Sicker.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:reg:rpubli:254 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Frieden, Rob, 2013. "The mixed blessing of a deregulatory endpoint for the public switched telephone network," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 400-412.
    3. Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 65-101, April.
    4. Trillas, Francesc, 2010. "Independent regulators: Theory, evidence and reform proposals," IESE Research Papers D/860, IESE Business School.
    5. Günter Knieps, 2015. "The Positive Theory of Regulation," Springer Texts in Business and Economics, in: Network Economics, edition 127, chapter 9, pages 157-169, Springer.
    6. Mark A. Jamison & Janice A. Hauge, 2014. "Do Common Carriage, Special Infrastructure, And General Purpose Technology Rationales Justify Regulating Communications Networks?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 475-493.
    7. Kyle Wilson, 2016. "Does Public Competition Crowd Out Private Investment? Evidence from Municipal Provision of Internet Access," Working Papers 16-16, NET Institute.
    8. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    9. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
    10. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    11. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Delegation to Independent Regulators and the Ratchet Effect," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0911, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    12. Spulber, Daniel F & Besanko, David, 1992. "Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 126-154, March.
    13. Amanda B. Delp & John W. Mayo, 2017. "The Evolution of “Competition”: Lessons for 21st Century Telecommunications Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 393-416, June.
    14. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    15. Lehr, William & Sicker, Douglas, 2016. "Would you like your Internet with or without video?," 27th European Regional ITS Conference, Cambridge (UK) 2016 148683, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2010-033, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    3. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.
    4. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Ando, Amy, 1998. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-43-rev, Resources for the Future.
    6. Cyril Benoît, 2021. "Politicians, regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(S1), pages 8-22, November.
    7. Rocco Ciciretti & Simone Meraglia & Gustavo Piga, 2011. "Capture, Politics and Antitrust Effectiveness," CEIS Research Paper 208, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 05 Apr 2013.
    8. Moszoro, Marian W. & Spiller, Pablo T., 2014. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications," MPRA Paper 101592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ellen Seljan, 2014. "The limits of tax and expenditure limits: TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 485-501, June.
    10. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Delegation to Independent Regulators and the Ratchet Effect," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0911, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    11. Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 267-284, June.
    12. Raffaele Fiocco & Roland Strausz, 2015. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 550-569, September.
    13. Marco Sorge, 2015. "Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
    14. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    15. Pablo T. Spiller & Sanny Liao, 2006. "Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey," NBER Working Papers 12209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    17. Ando, Amy Whritenour, 1999. "Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 29-60, April.
    18. Knieps, Günter & Weiß, Hans-Jörg, 2008. "Regulatory agencies and regulatory risk," Discussion Papers 118 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    19. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
    20. Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-25, Resources for the Future.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:itse17:169478. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.itseurope.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.