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What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation

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Listed author(s):
  • Antonio Estache
  • Liam Wren-Lewis

Abstract

This paper reviews the theories of corruption in regulated sectors to further understand the impact of corruption and the ways in which it can be reduced. The aim is to draw out the policy implications of the different theoretical approaches and to examine the support that can be garnered for such policies from empirical evidence and practice. We then attempt to draw out some of the broader lessons that can be learnt for anti-corruption policy in general.

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File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/63115/1/2010-033-ESTACHE_WRENLEWIS-anticorruption.pdf
File Function: 2010-033-ESTACHE_WRENLEWIS-anticorruption
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Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers ECARES with number ECARES 2010-033.

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Length: 32 p.
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Publication status: Published by:
Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/63115
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
  • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
  • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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Cited by:

  1. Izak Atiyas, 2012. "Enhancing Competition in A Post-Revolutionary Arab Context: Does the Turkish Experience Provide any Lessons?," Working Papers 743, Economic Research Forum, revised Dec 2012.

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