IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v61y1989i1p1-13.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The selection of public utility commissioners: A re-examination of the importance of institutional setting

Author

Listed:
  • William Boyes
  • John McDowell

Abstract

The result of a great many studies is that it makes no difference to the rate level whether the public utility commission is appointed or elected. Nevertheless, the typical response to an inquiry regarding the effect of appointment versus election is that a difference in resulting rate structure should exist. In this paper we have reconciled these views and more carefully examined the issue of whether institutional setting does matter in the setting of regulated electricity prices. We suggest that one should not necessarily expect elected PUCs to behave differently than appointed ones. Instead different behavior should be expected from PUCs that are ‘closer’ to their constituents than those more isolated, irrespective of whether the PUC is elected or appointed. The results of an empirical examination based on a large sample of utilities operating during the period of 1981-83 support this view. The more narrowly defined is the consumer voter-group, everything else the same, the lower is the rate set by the PUC. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • William Boyes & John McDowell, 1989. "The selection of public utility commissioners: A re-examination of the importance of institutional setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 1-13, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:61:y:1989:i:1:p:1-13
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00116759
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00116759
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00116759?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Toma, Eugenia Froedge, 1983. "Institutional Structures, Regulation, and Producer Gains in the Education Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 103-116, April.
    2. Smiley, Robert H. & Greene, William H., 1983. "Determinants of the effectiveness of electric utility regulation," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 65-81, March.
    3. Jarrell, Gregg A, 1978. "The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 269-295, October.
    4. Ryan Amacher & William Boyes, 1978. "Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 5-13, January.
    5. Walter Primeaux & Patrick Mann, 1985. "Voter power and electricity prices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 519-525, January.
    6. Peter Navarro, 1982. "Public Utility Commission Regulation: Performance, Determinants, and Energy Policy Impacts," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 119-140.
    7. Robert L. Hagerman & Brian T. Ratchford, 1978. "Some Determinants of Allowed Rates of Return on Equity to Electric Utilities," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 46-55, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Joseph A. Fields & Chinmoy Ghosh & Linda S. Klein, 1998. "From Competition To Regulation: The Six‐Year Battle To Regulate California'S Insurance Markets," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 1(2), pages 54-71, January.
    2. Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Gregory DeAngelo & Adam Nowak & Imke Reimers, 2018. "Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence From The Nhl," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 183-191, January.
    4. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Rode, David C. & Fischbeck, Paul S., 2019. "Regulated equity returns: A puzzle," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    6. Daniel R. Hollas & Stanley R. Stansell, 1991. "Regulation, Ownership Form, And The Economic Efficiency Of Rural Electric Distribution Cooperatives," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 21(2), pages 201-220, Summer.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 1996. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 165-182, Spring.
    2. Susan R. Smart, 1994. "The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party Control for Telecommunications Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 301-323, June.
    3. G. Sav, 1986. "The politics of race in higher education: Governing boards and constituents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 147-155, January.
    4. Troy Quast, 2008. "Do elected public utility commissioners behave more politically than appointed ones?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 318-337, June.
    5. Savitski, David W., 2003. "Ownership selection in the US electric utility industry," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 203-223, December.
    6. Rode, David C. & Fischbeck, Paul S., 2019. "Regulated equity returns: A puzzle," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    7. Crone, Lisa & Tschirhart, John, 1998. "Separating economic from political influences on government decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 405-425, May.
    8. Heather E. Campbell, 1996. "The politics of requesting: Strategic behavior and public utility regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(3), pages 395-423.
    9. Tin Cheuk Leung & Kwok Ping Ping & Kevin K. Tsui, 2019. "What can deregulators deregulate? The case of electricity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-32, August.
    10. Kitchens, Carl T. & Jaworski, Taylor, 2017. "Ownership and the price of residential electricity: Evidence from the United States, 1935–1940," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 53-61.
    11. Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2018. "Guns, Environment, and Abortion: How Single-Minded Voters Shape Politicians' Decisions," Working Papers gueconwpa~18-18-15, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    12. Çetin, Tamer & Yasin Eryigit, Kadir, 2013. "The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 169-177.
    13. Noble, Stephanie M. & Lee, Kang Bok & Zaretzki, Russell & Autry, Chad, 2017. "Coupon clipping by impoverished consumers: Linking demographics, basket size, and coupon redemption rates," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 553-571.
    14. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    15. David P. Baron, 1978. "Price Regulation, Quality, and Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Gertrud Fremling & John Lott, 1988. "Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 73-78, July.
    17. Randall G. Holcombe, 2019. "Transitional gains and rent extraction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 127-139, October.
    18. Palmer, Karen & Ando, Amy, 1998. "Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring," RFF Working Paper Series dp-98-19-rev, Resources for the Future.
    19. Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2013. "Guns and Votes," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
      • Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2014. "Guns and Votes," NBER Working Papers 20253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Laurent Bouton & Paola Conconi & Francisco Pino & Maurizio Zanardi, 2013. "Guns and votes," Working Papers 43819146, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
      • Zanardi, Maurizio & Conconi, Paola & Bouton, Laurent & Pino, Francisco, 2013. "Guns and Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 9726, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. John R. Lott, Jr., 1987. "Why Is Education Publicly Provided? A Critical Survey," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 7(2), pages 475-501, Fall.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:61:y:1989:i:1:p:1-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.