IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Palmer, Karen

    ()

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Ando, Amy

Abstract

Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-98-19-REV.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-98-19-rev.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 1998
Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-98-19-rev
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.rff.org

More information through EDIRC

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-679, June.
  2. Bohi, Douglas R. & Palmer, Karen L., 1996. "The efficiency of wholesale vs. retail competition in electricity," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(8), pages 12-20, October.
  3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  4. Palmer, Karen & Burtraw, Dallas, 1997. "Electricity restructuring and regional air pollution," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 139-174, March.
  5. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers dp-97-25, Resources For the Future.
  7. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
  8. Robert L. Hagerman & Brian T. Ratchford, 1978. "Some Determinants of Allowed Rates of Return on Equity to Electric Utilities," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 46-55, Spring.
  9. Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. & Patrick C. Mann, 1986. "Regulator Selection Methods and Electricity Prices," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(1), pages 1-13.
  10. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
  11. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as
in new window


Cited by:

  1. Palmer, Karen & Brennan, Timothy & Martinez, Salvador, 2001. "Implementing Electricity Restructuring: Policies, Potholes, and Prospects," Discussion Papers dp-01-62-, Resources For the Future.
  2. Bushnell, James, 2010. "Building Blocks: Investment in Renewable and Non-Renewable Technologies," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31546, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Faye Steiner, 2004. "The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 59-80, January.
  4. Meredith Fowlie, 2010. "Emissions Trading, Electricity Restructuring, and Investment in Pollution Abatement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 837-869, June.
  5. Burtraw, Dallas, 1998. "Cost Savings, Market Performance and Economic Benefits of the U.S. Acid Rain Program," Discussion Papers dp-98-28-rev, Resources For the Future.
  6. Nagayama, Hiroaki, 2010. "Impacts on investments, and transmission/distribution loss through power sector reforms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 3453-3467, July.
  7. Vladimir Hlasny, 2010. "The Political Economy Of Deregulation In The U.S. Gas Distribution Market," ICER Working Papers 29-2010, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  8. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillen, 2004. "International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-713, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  9. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen, 2005. "The Environmental Impacts of Electricity Restructuring: Looking Back and Looking Forward," Discussion Papers dp-05-07, Resources For the Future.
  10. Chang, Chun Ping & Berdiev, Aziz N., 2011. "The political economy of energy regulation in OECD countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 816-825, September.
  11. Nagayama, Hiroaki, 2009. "Electric power sector reform liberalization models and electric power prices in developing countries: An empirical analysis using international panel data," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 463-472, May.
  12. Sharabaroff, Alexander & Boyd, Roy & Chimeli, Ariaster, 2009. "The environmental and efficiency effects of restructuring on the electric power sector in the United States: An empirical analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4884-4893, November.
  13. Donald N. Dewees, 2006. "Electricity Restructuring and Regulation in the Provinces: Ontario and Beyond," Working Papers tecipa-205, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  14. Michel Berthélemy & Petyo Bonev & Damien Dussaux & Magnus Söderberg, 2017. "Methods for strengthening a weak instrument in the case of a persistent treatment," GRI Working Papers 265, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  15. Mozumder, Pallab & Marathe, Achla, 2004. "Gains from an integrated market for tradable renewable energy credits," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 259-272, July.
  16. Paroma Sanyal, 2005. "Powering a Green Progress: The Effect of Electricity Deregulation on Environmental Research," Industrial Organization 0504015, EconWPA.
  17. Delmas, Magali & Tokat, Yesim, 2003. "Deregulation Process, Governance Structures and Efficiency: The U.S. Electric Utility Sector," Research Papers 1790, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  18. Vladimir Hlasny, 2011. "The Political Economy of Deregulation in the US Gas Distribution Market," Chapters,in: Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  19. Sanyal, Paroma & Bulan, Laarni T., 2011. "Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 248-268, June.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-98-19-rev. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.