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From Senators to the President: Solve the lumber problem or else

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  • Daowei Zhang
  • David Laband

Abstract

We use key events associated in the two decade-long U.S.–Canada softwood lumber trade dispute to present the dynamic relationship between U.S. Congress and the Administration in the formation of international trade policy. We find that the executive branch of the U.S. government responded quickly to several letters from a group of U.S. Senators demanding a solution to the “lumber problem.” A roll call analysis is used to identify factors influencing Senators’ willingness to sign these letters and pressure the President on behalf of the U.S. lumber industry. The results show that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a Senator’s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a Senator less likely to sign these letters. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Daowei Zhang & David Laband, 2005. "From Senators to the President: Solve the lumber problem or else," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 393-410, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:123:y:2005:i:3:p:393-410
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-7168-z
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    1. Zhang, Daowei & Tanger, Shaun, 2017. "Is there a connection between campaign contributions and legislative commitment? An empirical analysis on the cosponsorship activity of the 2007 Tree Act," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(P1), pages 85-94.
    2. Raghbendra Jha & Hari K. Nagarajan & Kailash C. Pradhan, 2011. "Aligning With One's Own: Private Voting and Public Outcomes in Elections in Rural India," ASARC Working Papers 2011-09, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
    3. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    4. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.

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