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The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market

Listed author(s):
  • Çetin, Tamer
  • Yasin Eryigit, Kadir

This paper empirically investigates the economic effects of government regulation in a regulated taxicab market. We use a cointegration model with structural breaks to test the hypothesis that government regulation increases the price of the regulated good and/or causes the monopoly price. We examine the New York taxicab market and argue that regulation brings about artificial rents by increasing medallion prices, and an increase in medallion prices gives rises to upward pressure on taxi fares. The evidence presented shows that regulation of the New York taxicab market increases medallion prices, and this increase in medallion prices pressures on taxi fares.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X12001862
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Transport Policy.

Volume (Year): 25 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 169-177

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Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:25:y:2013:i:c:p:169-177
DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2012.11.011
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  1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
  2. Peltzman, Sam, 1993. "George Stigler's Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 818-832, October.
  3. M. Hashem Pesaran & Yongcheol Shin, 2002. "Long-Run Structural Modelling," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 49-87.
  4. D. Parker, 2002. "Economic Regulation: a review of issues," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 493-519, December.
  5. Søren Johansen & Rocco Mosconi & Bent Nielsen, 2000. "Cointegration analysis in the presence of structural breaks in the deterministic trend," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 3(2), pages 216-249.
  6. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
  7. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
  8. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  9. Junsoo Lee & Mark C. Strazicich, 2013. "Minimum LM unit root test with one structural break," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(4), pages 2483-2492.
  10. Benedikt Koehler, 2005. "Licence Values In Taxi Markets," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 52-54, 06.
  11. Beesley, Michael E & Glaister, Stephen G, 1983. "Information for Regulating: The Case of Taxis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(371), pages 594-615, September.
  12. Sean D. Barrett, 2003. "Regulatory Capture, Property Rights And Taxi Deregulation: A Case Study," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 34-40, December.
  13. Braeutigam, Ronald R., 1989. "Optimal policies for natural monopolies," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1289-1346 Elsevier.
  14. Adrian T. Moore & Ted Balaker, 2006. "Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Taxi Deregulation?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 3(1), pages 109-132, January.
  15. Søren Johansen & Rocco Mosconi & Bent Nielsen, 2000. "Cointegration analysis in the presence of structural breaks in the deterministic trend," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 3(2), pages 216-249.
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