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Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets


  • Bruce Gardner


Efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention. The implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs. The results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient, given the political power of interest groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Gardner, 1983. "Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-234.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:65:y:1983:i:2:p:225-234.

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    1. Francois, Joseph & Nelson, Douglas R., 2014. "Political support for trade policy in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 243-253.
    2. de Gorter, Harry, 2008. "Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 48638, World Bank.
    3. D. MacLaren, 1991. "Agricultural Trade Policy Analysis And International Trade Theory: A Review Of Recent Developments," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 250-297.
    4. Kilmer, Richard L. & Armbruster, Walter J., 1984. "Methods For Evaluating Economic Efficiency In Agricultural Marketing," Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 16(01), July.
    5. Agathe Rouaix & Charles Figuières & Marc Willinger, 2015. "The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(3), pages 601-623, October.
    6. Giannakas Konstantinos & Fulton Murray, 2002. "Tough Love: Optimal Enforcement of Output Quotas in the Presence of Cheating," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, October.
    7. Pavel Ciaian & d'Artis Kancs & Maria Espinosa, 2016. "The Impact of the 2013 CAP Reform on the Decoupled Payments' Capitalization into Land Values," JRC Working Papers JRC101619, Joint Research Centre (Seville site).
    8. Schmitz, Troy G & Schmitz, Andrew & Dumas, Chris, 1997. "Gains from Trade, Inefficiency of Government Programs, and the Net Economic Effects of Trading," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 637-647, June.
    9. D. MacLaren, 1992. "The Political Economy Of Agricultural Policy Reform In The European Community And Australia," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 424-439.
    10. Bullock, David S, 1995. "Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1236-1274, December.
    11. Ian W.H. Parry, 1999. "Agricultural Policies in the Presence of Distorting Taxes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(1), pages 212-230.
    12. Jonathan Brooks, 1996. "Agricultural Policies In Oecd Countries: What Can We Learn From Political Economy Models?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1-4), pages 366-389.
    13. Just, Richard E. & Rausser, Gordon C., 1984. "Uncertain economic environments and conditional policies," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0q33x98s, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    14. Ellison Brenna & Lusk Jayson L & Briggeman Brian, 2010. "Other-Regarding Behavior and Taxpayer Preferences for Farm Policy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.
    15. David S. Bullock & Klaus Salhofer & Jukka Kola, 1999. "The Normative Analysis of Agricultural Policy: A General Framework and Review," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 512-535.
    16. Daniel Hassan & Hervé Ossard & Vincent Réquillart, 2000. "Effet d'un prix minimum sur le marché d'un bien différencié Le cas de la pomme dans l'Union européenne," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 258(1), pages 69-78.
    17. Baffes, John & De Gorter, Harry, 2005. "Disciplining agricultural support through decoupling," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3533, The World Bank.
    18. Lee, Dae-Seob & Kennedy, P. Lynn, 2002. "A Game Theoretic Analysis Of U.S. Rice Export Policy: The Case Of Japan And Korea," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19686, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    19. Skully, David W., 1999. "The Economics Of Trq Administration," Working Papers 14584, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    20. SHEA, Esther Y.P., 2010. "Understanding China's grain procurement policy from a perspective of optimization," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 639-649, December.
    21. Skully, David W., 2001. "Economics of Tariff-Rate Quota Administration," Technical Bulletins 184332, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    22. Fragoso, R. & Marques, C. & Lucas, M.R. & Martins, M.B. & Jorge, R., 2011. "The economic effects of common agricultural policy on Mediterranean montado/dehesa ecosystem," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 311-327, March.
    23. Huffman, Wallace E., 1985. "Changes in Human Capital, Technology, and Institutions: Implications for Policy and Research," 1985 Conference, August 26-September 4, 1985, Málaga, Spain 183054, International Association of Agricultural Economists.

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