IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/11429.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview

In: Studies in Public Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Paul L. Joskow
  • Roger G. Noll

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters,in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11429
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11429.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Noll, Roger G & Trijonis, John, 1971. "Mass Balance, General Equilibrium, and Environmental Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 730-735.
    3. Boyes, William J, 1976. "An Empirical Examination of the Averch-Johnson Effect," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(1), pages 25-35, March.
    4. Grether, David M, 1978. "Recent Psychological Studies of Behavior under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 70-74.
    5. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
    6. Benham, Lee, 1972. "The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 337-352, October.
    7. Jack Hirshleifer, 1958. "Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 451-462.
    8. Paul L. Joskow, 1972. "The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a Formal Regulatory Hearing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(2), pages 632-644, Autumn.
    9. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 966-977.
    10. John C. Panzar, 1976. "A Neoclassical Approach to Peak Load Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 521-530, Autumn.
    11. Paul W. MacAvoy & Roger Noll, 1973. "Relative Prices on Regulated Transactions of the Natural Gas Pipelines," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(1), pages 212-234, Spring.
    12. Paul W. MacAvoy, 1971. "The Formal Work-Product of the Federal Power Commissioners," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 379-395, Spring.
    13. Sheshinski, Eytan, 1971. "Welfare Aspects of a Regulatory Constraint: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 175-178.
    14. Harbeson, Robert W, 1969. "Toward Better Resource Allocation in Transport," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 321-338, October.
    15. Robert M. Spann, 1974. "Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(1), pages 38-52, Spring.
    16. Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, 1962. "Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 241-241.
    17. Ayres, Robert U & Kneese, Allen V, 1969. "Production , Consumption, and Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 282-297.
    18. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, 1977. "Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
    19. Benham, Lee & Benham, Alexandra, 1975. "Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 421-447, October.
    20. Kenneth J. Arrow & William M. Capron, 1959. "Dynamic Shortages and Price Rises: The Engineer-Scientist Case," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 292-308.
    21. Smith, Vernon L, 1976. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 274-279.
    22. Robert M. Spann & Edward W. Erickson, 1970. "The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Cartelization and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(2), pages 227-244, Autumn.
    23. Ralph Turvey, 1968. "Peak-Load Pricing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 101-101.
    24. Claude S. Colantoni & Otto A. Davis & Malati Swaminuthan, 1976. "Imperfect Consumers and Welfare Comparisons of Policies Concerning Information and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 602-615, Autumn.
    25. Boyer, Kenneth D, 1977. "Minimum Rate Regulation, Modal Split Sensitivities, and the Railroad Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 493-512, June.
    26. McGuire, Thomas & Nelson, Richard R & Spavins, Thomas, 1975. ""An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments": A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(3), pages 655-661, June.
    27. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
    28. Peltzman, Sam, 1973. "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1049-1091, Sept.-Oct.
    29. Peter O. Steiner, 1957. "Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 585-610.
    30. Grether, David M, 1978. "Recent Psychological Studies of Behavior under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 70-74.
    31. Robert S. Pindyck, 1974. "The Regulatory Implications of Three Alternative Econometric Supply Models of Natural Gas," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 633-645, Autumn.
    32. Elizabeth E. Bailey & Roger D. Coleman, 1971. "The Effect of Lagged Regulation in an Averch-Johnson Model," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 278-292, Spring.
    33. Alvin K. Klevorick, 1971. "The "Optimal" Fair Rate of Return," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 122-153, Spring.
    34. Michael Spence, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 561-572.
    35. Richard C. Levin, 1978. "Allocation in Surface Freight Transportation: Does Rate Regulation Matter?," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 18-45, Spring.
    36. Fiorina, Morris P. & Noll, Roger G., 1978. "Voters, bureaucrats and legislators : A rational choice perspective on the growth of bureaucracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 239-254.
    37. Kelvin J. Lancaster, 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74, pages 132-132.
    38. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1979. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 623-638.
    39. Benton F. Massell, 1969. "Price Stabilization and Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 284-298.
    40. Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Malone, 1970. "Resource Allocation and the Regulated Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(1), pages 129-142, Spring.
    41. Joseph L. Gastwirth, 1976. "On Probabilistic Models of Consumer Search for Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 38-50.
    42. Turnovsky, Stephen J, 1976. "The Distribution of Welfare Gains from Price Stabilization: The Case of Multiplicative Disturbances," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(1), pages 133-148, February.
    43. Louis L. Wilde & Alan Schwartz, 1979. "Equilibrium Comparison Shopping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 543-553.
    44. Wallace Hendricks, 1975. "The Effect of Regulation on Collective Bargaining in Electric Utilities," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 451-465, Autumn.
    45. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1979. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 623-638.
    46. John T. Wenders, 1976. "Peak Load Pricing in the Electric Utility Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 232-241, Spring.
    47. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 193-208.
    48. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, 1976. "Peak Load Pricing with a Diverse Technology," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 207-231, Spring.
    49. George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213-213.
    50. Leontief, Wassily, 1970. "Environmental Repercussions and the Economic Structure: An Input-Output Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 262-271.
    51. Baumol, William J & Braunstein, Yale M, 1977. "Empirical Study of Scale Economies and Production Complementarity: The Case of Journal Publication," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 1037-1048, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," CRSP working papers 492, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    2. Faye Steiner, 2004. "The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, pages 59-80.
    3. Yang, Chia-yen, 2000. "The organizational choice of public good provision," ISU General Staff Papers 2000010108000013664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 151, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    5. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
    6. Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1029-1073, June.
    7. Doucet, J. & Littlechild, S., 2006. "Negotiated Settlements: The development of economic and legal thinking," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0622, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Katrin Sobania, 2000. "Von Regulierungen zu Deregulierungen - Eine Analyse aus institutionenökonomischer Sicht -," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 37, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    9. Jorge Cornick, 2013. "The Organization of Public-Private Cooperation for Productive Development Policies," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 4590, Inter-American Development Bank.
    10. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1998. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions," NBER Working Papers 6637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Brigitte Unger & Franz Traxler, 1990. "Institutionelle Erfolgsbedingungen wirtschaftlichen Strukturwandels. Zum Verhältnis von Effizienz und Regulierung aus theoretischer und empirischer Sicht," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 16(2), pages 189-224.
    12. Hahn, Robert W., 1995. "Government markets and the theory of the Nth best," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 219-234.
    13. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters,in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Mathew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, 1984. "Constituency influences on legislative policy choice," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, pages 299-319.
    15. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    16. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, pages 201-224.
    17. Michael Hantke-Domas, 2003. "The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 165-194, March.
    18. Siebert, Horst, 1981. "Die Neuorientierung der amerikanischen Energiepolitik," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 3573, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    19. Krouse, Clement G, et al, 1999. "The Bell System Divestiture/Deregulation and the Efficiency of the Operating Companies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 61-87, April.
    20. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2013. "Essays on Electricity Market Reforms: A Cross-Country Applied Approach," MPRA Paper 47139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    22. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The economics and politics of financial modernization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 25-37.
    23. Chen, Kevin C.W. & Wang, Jiwei, 2007. "Accounting-based regulation in emerging markets: The case of China's seasoned-equity offerings," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 221-236.
    24. Palmer, Karen & Ando, Amy, 1998. "Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring," Discussion Papers dp-98-19-rev, Resources For the Future.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11429. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: () or (Joanne Lustig). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.