Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games
We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.
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- ten Raa, Thijs, 1983. "Supportability and anonymous equity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 176-181, October.
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehle, 2004.
"Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores,"
Game Theory and Information
- William W. Sharkey, 1981. "Existence of Sustainable Prices for Natural Monopoly Outputs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 144-154, Spring.
- Baumol, William J & Bailey, Elizabeth E & Willig, Robert D, 1977. "Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 350-65, June.
- Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-77, December.
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