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Eficiencia y equidad en el diseño de precios óptimos para bienes y servicios públicos

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  • María Angeles García Valiñas

    () (Universidad de Oviedo)

Abstract

La motivación fundamental de esta investigación ha radicado en revisar las posibilidades que manejan los entes públicos en el diseño de instrumentos de financiación basados en el principio del beneficio. Numerosos bienes y servicios públicos son suministrados a cambio de una contraprestación directa por parte de los usuarios. En este sentido, la estructura de estas tarifas ha de ser analizada con detalle, para intentar perfeccionar el sistema de ingresos del sector público (Albi et al., 2000). Las diferentes opciones han sido abordadas en función de su complejidad, centrándose en el papel que tienen los criterios de eficiencia y equidad en este contexto. Igualmente, en base al trabajo seminal de Ramsey (1927), se han mostrado las conexiones existentes con la Teoría de la Imposición Óptima.

Suggested Citation

  • María Angeles García Valiñas, 2004. "Eficiencia y equidad en el diseño de precios óptimos para bienes y servicios públicos," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 168(1), pages 95-119, march.
  • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2004:v:168:i:1:p:95-119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    . fijación de precios en el sector público; eficiencia; equidad.;

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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