IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mit/sloanp/1958.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Monopolistic two-part pricing arrangements

Author

Listed:
  • Schmalensee, Richard.

Abstract

This article is mainly concerned with Walter Oi's Disneyland problem: pricing a fixed input (admission to the park or Polaroid cameras) and a variable input (individual rides or Polaroid film) to maximize profit, though profit-constrained welfare maximization is also treated. The structure of demand in such situations is fully described when customers are either households or competitive firms. The implications of customer diversity and other market attributes for optimal policies are presented. The welfare properties of single-price and two-part tariff monopoly equilibria are compared, and potential welfare gains from tying contracts are discussed.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Schmalensee, Richard., 1980. "Monopolistic two-part pricing arrangements," Working papers 1105-80., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:1958
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1958
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    HD28 .M414 no.1105-; 80;

    JEL classification:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:1958. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: None (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ssmitus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.