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Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorial and Income Information in Designing Tax / Transfer Schemes

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  • Immonen, Ritva
  • Kanbur, Ravi
  • Keen, Michael
  • Tuomala, Matti

Abstract

It is widely recognised that optimal tax/transfer schemes will generally involve elements of both 'tagging' (the use of categorical benefits) and 'means-testing' (Income-relation of benefits). This paper explores the optimal design of such mixed schemes. Simulations suggest a striking qualitative dissimilarity between the group-specific schedules optimally imposed on the poorer and richer groups: broadly speaking, the optimal marginal tax rate decreases with income amongst the latter, but increases with income amongst the former. This latter observation, potentially important for policy, runs counter to the conventional wisdom from previous simulations; the reconciliation, we argue, lies in the role played in optimal tax design by the revenue constraint. The simulations also suggest that gains from the appropriate use of categorical information can plausibly be substantial.

Suggested Citation

  • Immonen, Ritva & Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael & Tuomala, Matti, 1996. "Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorial and Income Information in Designing Tax / Transfer Schemes," Discussion Papers 128, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fer:dpaper:128
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Pestieau & Maria Racionero, 2015. "Tagging with leisure needs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 687-706, December.
    2. Homburg Stefan & Lohse Tim, 2005. "Optimal Taxes and Transfers under Partial Information," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 225(6), pages 622-629, December.
    3. Randall P. Ellis & Ching‐to Albert Ma, 2011. "Health insurance, cost expectations, and adverse job turnover," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 27-44, January.
    4. Louis Kaplow, 2007. "Optimal income transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(3), pages 295-325, June.
    5. Robert A. Moffitt, 2003. "The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program," NBER Chapters, in: Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, pages 291-364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Stuart Adam, 2005. "Measuring the marginal efficiency cost of redistribution in the UK," IFS Working Papers W05/14, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    7. Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Tagging and redistributive taxation," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 83-84, pages 123-147.
    8. María Angeles García Valiñas, 2004. "Eficiencia y equidad en el diseño de precios óptimos para bienes y servicios públicos," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 168(1), pages 95-119, march.
    9. Boadway,Robin & Cuff,Katherine, 2022. "Tax Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108949453.
    10. Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2008. "Age‐related Optimal Income Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(1), pages 45-71, March.
    11. Moffitt, Robert A., 2002. "Welfare programs and labor supply," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 34, pages 2393-2430, Elsevier.
    12. Ray Rees & Thor O. Thoresen & Trine E. Vattø, 2023. "Alternatives to Paying Child Benefit to the Rich: Means‐Testing or Higher Tax?," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 56(3), pages 328-354, September.
    13. Kanbur, Ravi & Tuomala, Matti, 2002. "Understanding The Evolution Of Inequality During Transition: The Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 7240, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.

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