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Tagging and Redistributive Taxation

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Listed author(s):
  • Robin Boadway

    ()

    (Queen's University)

  • Pierre Pestieau

    ()

    (Universite de Liege)

Abstract

We study the optimal redistributive tax structure when the population can be disaggregated into tagged groups. We begin with the case in which the tag has no normative significance, but simply separates the population into identifiable groups with different distributions of ability-types. Under reasonable circumstances, the tax system will be more redistributive in the tagged group with the higher proportion of high-ability persons. We then extend the analysis to the case where the tag reflects differences in needs, that is, differences in the resources required to achieve a given level of utility, for example, due to a medical condition or a disability. The amount of compensation given for needs depends on whether the income tax structure is differentiated by needs groups.

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File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1071.pdf
File Function: First version 2006
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1071.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1071
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Keywords: optimal income tax; tagging; needs;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
  • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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  1. Nicholas Rowe & Frances Woolley, 1999. "The Efficiency Case for Universality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 613-629, May.
  2. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2001. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisted," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(3), pages 781-799, August.
  3. Immonen, Ritva, et al, 1998. "Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer Schemes," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(258), pages 179-192, May.
  4. Robin Boadway, 2004. "The Theory and Practice of Equalization," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(1), pages 211-254.
  5. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1994. "Information and Intergroup Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 440-447, May.
  6. Laurence Jacquet & Bruno Van der Linden, 2006. "The Normative Analysis of Tagging Revisited: Dealing with Stigmatization," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(2), pages 168-198, June.
  7. BOADWAY, Robin & LEITE-MONTEIR, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, "undated". "Social insurance and redistribution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1643, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Virginia Hernanz & Franck Malherbet & Michele Pellizzari, 2004. "Take-Up of Welfare Benefits in OECD Countries: A Review of the Evidence," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 17, OECD Publishing.
  9. Alan D. Viard, 2001. "Some Results on the Comparative Statics of Optimal Categorical Transfer Payments," Public Finance Review, , vol. 29(2), pages 148-180, March.
  10. Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 2000. "Redistribution," Handbook of Income Distribution,in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 677-789 Elsevier.
  11. Guesnerie, Roger & Seade, Jesus, 1982. "Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-179, March.
  12. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
  13. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March.
  14. Ritva Immonen & Kanbur, Kanbur & Michael Keen & Matti Tuomola, 1994. "Tagging and taxing: the optimal use of categorical and income information in designing tax/transfer schemes," IFS Working Papers W94/05, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  15. BOADWAY, Robin & PESTIEAU, Pierre, "undated". "Indirect taxation and redistribution: the scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1647, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
  17. Viard, Alan D, 2001. " Optimal Categorical Transfer Payments: The Welfare Economics of Limited Lump-Sum Redistribution," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 483-500.
  18. Jonathan Hamilton & Pierre Pestieau, 2005. "Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, January.
  19. Robert A. Pollak, 1971. "Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 401-414.
  20. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
  21. Keen, Michael, 1992. "Needs and Targeting," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 67-79, January.
  22. Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October.
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Cited by:

  1. Craig Brett, 2012. "The effects of population aging on optimal redistributive taxes in an overlapping generations model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(6), pages 777-799, December.
  2. Weinzierl, Matthew, 2014. "The promise of positive optimal taxation: normative diversity and a role for equal sacrifice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 128-142.
  3. Spencer Bastani, 2013. "Gender-based and couple-based taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(4), pages 653-686, August.
  4. Spencer Bastani & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2013. "The Welfare Gains Of Age‐Related Optimal Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 1219-1249, November.
  5. Sebastian Kessing & Vilen Lipatov & Jens Malte Zoubek, 2014. "Optimal Taxation under Regional Inequality," CESifo Working Paper Series 5152, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Kanbur, Ravi & Tuomala, Matti, 2016. "Groupings and the gains from tagging," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 53-63.
  7. Matthew C. Weinzierl, 2012. "Why do we Redistribute so Much but Tag so Little? The principle of equal sacrifice and optimal taxation," NBER Working Papers 18045, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Melisa Bubonya & David P. Byrne, 2015. "Supplying Slot Machines to the Poor," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2015n15, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
  9. Stuart Adam, 2005. "Measuring the marginal efficiency cost of redistribution in the UK," IFS Working Papers W05/14, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  10. Laurence JACQUET & Etienne LEHMANN, 2014. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Multidimensional Types: The Case with Heterogeneous Behavioral Responses," THEMA Working Papers 2014-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  11. Leung, Tin Cheuk & Yazici, Hakki, 2011. "On the Optimal Skill Distribution in a Mirrleesian Economy," MPRA Paper 32596, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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