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Social insurance and redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • BOADWAY, Robin
  • LEITE-MONTEIR, Manuel
  • MARCHAND, Maurice
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable particularly when there is a negative correlation between laborproductivity and loss probability.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • BOADWAY, Robin & LEITE-MONTEIR, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2003. "Social insurance and redistribution," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1643, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1643
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00446.x
    Note: In : S. Cnossen and H.-W. Sinn (eds.), Public Finance and Public Policy in the New Century. Cambridge, The MIT Press, 333-358, 2003
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Cremer, Helmuth & Roeder, Kerstin, 2017. "Social insurance with competitive insurance markets and risk misperception," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 138-147.
    3. Mathias Kifmann & Kerstin Roeder, 2014. "The Political Sustainability of a Basic Income Scheme and Social Health Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 4986, CESifo.
    4. Robin Boadway & Manuel Leite‐Monteiro & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 279-298, July.
    5. Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2004. "Assurance privée et protection sociale," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 114(5), pages 577-586.
    6. Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Income Taxation, Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar (TAPES), pages 85-114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Keuschnigg, Christian & Ribi, Evelyn, 2009. "Outsourcing, unemployment and welfare policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 168-176, June.
    8. BURGGRAEVE Koen & DU CAJU Philip, 2010. "How Do Reference Values for Wages and Wage Indexing Influence the Impact of Labour Tax Reductions?," EcoMod2003 330700028, EcoMod.
    9. Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau, 2006. "Tagging and redistributive taxation," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 83-84, pages 123-147.
    10. Susanna Kochskämper, 2012. "Reformdebatten in der Krankenversicherung vor dem Hintergrund des europäischen Binnenmarktes," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 02/2012, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    11. Stéphanie Maillot-Bugnon, 2005. "Assurance maladie et redistribution : le cas de l'arrêt maladie," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 427-443.
    12. Francesca Barigozzi, 2006. "Supplementary Insurance with 'ex post' moral hazard: efficiency and redistribution," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 83-84, pages 295-325.
    13. Billy Jack, 2003. "Redistributing to the sick: How should health expenditures be integrated into the tax system?," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-16, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    14. Alessandro Petretto, 2013. "On the Fuzzy Boundaries between Public and Private in Health-Care Organization and Funding Systems," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 1, pages 327-370, January-M.
    15. Rosalind Bell-Aldeghi, 2019. "Interactions between Social and Topping Up Insurance under ex-post Moral Hazard," Working Papers 2019-01, CRESE.
    16. Peter Backus & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2014. "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?," Working Papers 2014/33, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    17. Yiqing Xing & Anqi Li, 2014. "Simple Labor Income Tax Systems with Endogenous Employment Contracts," 2014 Meeting Papers 866, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Anil Duman, 2010. "Risks in the labor market and social insurance preferences: Germany and the USA," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 150-164, January.
    19. Koen Burggraeve & Philip Du Caju, 2003. "The labour market and fiscal impact of labour reductions: the case of reduction of employers' social security contributions under a wage norm regime with automatic price indexing of wages," Working Paper Research 36, National Bank of Belgium.
    20. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    21. Bell-Aldeghi, Rosalind, 2019. "Interactions between Social and Topping Up Insurance under ex-post Moral Hazard," MPRA Paper 92417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Peter Backus & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2014. "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?," Working Papers 2014/33, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health

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