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Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation

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  • Richard Arnott
  • Joseph Stiglitz

Abstract

The central result of this paper is that when moral hazard is present, shadow prices in general differ from market prices. To remedy this market failure, the government should introduce differential commodity taxation. Moral hazard causes people to take too little care to prevent accidents. The corresponding deadweight loss can be reduced by subsidizing (taxing) those goods the consumption of which encourages (discourages) accident avoidance. At the constrained optimum, the sum of the deadweight losses and differential commodity taxation is minimized. Policy implications are derived and discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1982. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation," Working Papers 500, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:500
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arnott, Richard J & Hosios, Arthur J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Implicit Contracts, Labor Mobility, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1046-1066, December.
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    9. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L68 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Appliances; Furniture; Other Consumer Durables

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