IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data

  • Janet Currie
  • Firouz Gahvari

We review theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence. After reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments, we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self-targeting. We then discuss the large literature on in-kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations, including the "Samaritan's Dilemma," pecuniary effects, credit constraints, asymmetric information amongst agents, and political economy considerations. Our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-kind transfer programs but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases. Political economy considerations must also be part of the story.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.46.2.333
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.

Volume (Year): 46 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 333-383

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:46:y:2008:i:2:p:333-83
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.46.2.333
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/journal
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Pagano, Marco & Jappelli, Tullio, 1993. " Information Sharing in Credit Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1693-1718, December.
  2. Sören Blömquist & Vidar Christiansen, 1998. "Price Subsidies Versus Public Provision," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(3), pages 283-306, July.
  3. Bruce D. Meyer & Dan T. Rosenbaum, 2001. "Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 1063-1114.
  4. A. Lans Bovenberg & Bas Jacobs, 2005. "Redistribution and Education Subsidies are Siamese Twins," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-036/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998. "The political economy of targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.
  6. Brennan, Geoffrey & Walsh, Cliff, 1977. "Pareto-Desirable Redistribution in Kind: An Impossibility Theorem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 987-990, December.
  7. Firouz Gahvari & Enlinson Mattos, 2007. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 491-502, March.
  8. M. Keane & R. Moffitt, . "A structural model of multiple welfare program participation and labor supply," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1080-96, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  9. Allen N. Berger & Richard J. Rosen & Gregory F. Udell, 2001. "The effect of market size structure on competition: the case of small business lending," Working Paper Series WP-01-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  10. Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2005. "Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2895-2923, December.
  11. Bertrand, M. & Luttmer, E.F.P. & Mullainathan, S., 1998. "Network Effects and Welfare Cultures," Papers 201, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  12. Michael P. Murray, 1978. "A Reinterpretation of the Traditional Income-Leisure Model, with Application to In Kind Subsidy Programs," Working Papers 307, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  13. Casey Mulligan & Tomas Philipson, . "Merit Motives and Government Intervention: Public Finance in Reverse," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 2000-03, Chicago - Population Research Center.
  14. Alistair Munro, 1990. "Self-Selection and Optimal In-Kind Transfers," Working Papers Series 90/3, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  15. Bourguignon, Francois & Ferreira, Francisco H. G. & Leite, Phillippe G., 2002. "Ex-ante evaluation of conditional cash transfer programs: the case of bolsa escola," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2916, The World Bank.
  16. Alderman, Harold, 2002. "Subsidies as a social safety net: effectiveness and challenges," Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 25299, The World Bank.
  17. BOADWAY, Robin & LEITE-MONTEIR, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Social insurance and redistribution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1643, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  18. Currie, Janet & Gruber, Jonathan, 1996. "Saving Babies: The Efficacy and Cost of Recent Changes in the Medicaid Eligibility of Pregnant Women," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1263-1296, December.
  19. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042 Elsevier.
  20. Stephen Coate, 1987. "Cash Versus Direct Food Relief," Discussion Papers 724R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. James Heckman & Flavio Cunha, 2007. "The Technology of Skill Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 31-47, May.
  22. Janet Currie & Duncan Thomas, 1993. "Does Head Start Make a Difference?," NBER Working Papers 4406, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Paul A. Hagstrom, 1996. "The Food Stamp Participation and Labor Supply of Married Couples: An Empirical Analysis of Joint Decisions," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(2), pages 383-403.
  24. Janet Currie & Brigitte C. Madrian, 1998. "Health, Health Insurance and the Labor Market," JCPR Working Papers 27, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  25. O'Donoghue, Ted & Rabin, Matthew, 1997. "Doing It Now or Later," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7t44m5b0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  26. Aaron S. Yelowitz, 1996. "Did Recent Medicaid Reforms Cause the Caseload Explosion in the Food Stamp Program?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 756, UCLA Department of Economics.
  27. Jeffrey R. Kling & Jeffrey Liebman & Lawrence F. Katz & Lisa Sanbonmatsu, 2004. "Moving to Opportunity and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency and Health From a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment," Working Papers 5, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  28. Pedro Carneiro & James J. Heckman, 2002. "The Evidence on Credit Constraints in Post--secondary Schooling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 705-734, October.
  29. Benabou, R., 1996. "Inequality and Growth," Working Papers 96-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  30. Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-54, November.
  31. Deaton, Angus, 1979. "Optimally uniform commodity taxes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 357-361.
  32. A. S. Yelowitz, . "The Medicaid notch, labor supply, and welfare participation: Evidence from eligibility expansions," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1084-96, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  33. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Ladoux, Norbert, 1998. "Externalities and optimal taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 343-364, December.
  34. Gelbach Jonah B. & Pritchett Lant, 2002. "Is More for the Poor Less for the Poor? The Politics of Means-Tested Targeting," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-28, July.
  35. David Card & Carlos Dobkin & Nicole Maestas, 2004. "The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization and Health: Evidence from Medicare," NBER Working Papers 10365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Rebecca M. Blank & Patricia Ruggles, 1993. "When Do Women Use AFDC & Food Stamps? The Dynamics of Eligibility vs. Participation," NBER Working Papers 4429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Guesnerie, Roger & Roberts, Kevin, 1984. "Effective Policy Tools and Quantity Controls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 59-86, January.
  38. Pinto, Santiago M., 2004. "Assistance to poor households when income is not observed: targeted in-kind and in-cash transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 536-553, November.
  39. BOADWAY, Robin & LEITE-MONTEIRO, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2004. "Social insurance and redistribution with moral hazard and adverse selection," CORE Discussion Papers 2004083, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  40. Diane Whitmore, 2002. "What Are Food Stamps Worth?," Working Papers 847, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  41. Janet Currie, 2003. "U.S. Food and Nutrition Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, pages 199-290 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  42. Dan Usher, 1976. "The Welfare Economics of the Socialization of Commodities," Working Papers 218, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  43. Anderberg, Dan, 2001. " Social Insurance with In-Kind Provision of Private Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(1), pages 41-61, March.
  44. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice, 1995. "The Use of Public Expenditures for Redistributive Purposes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 45-59, January.
  45. Behrman, Jere R. & Hoddinott, John, 2001. "An evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on pre-school child height," FCND discussion papers 104, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  46. repec:pri:indrel:dsp01qz20ss50t is not listed on IDEAS
  47. repec:pri:cheawb:kling_mto481.pdf is not listed on IDEAS
  48. Todd Sinai & Joel Waldfogel, . "Do Low Income Housing Subsidies Increase Housing Consumption?," Zell/Lurie Center Working Papers 394, Wharton School Samuel Zell and Robert Lurie Real Estate Center, University of Pennsylvania.
  49. Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., . "Redistributive taxation and social insurance," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1235, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  50. Miguel Gouveia, 1997. "Majority rule and the public provision of a private good," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 221-244, December.
  51. Janet Currie & Aaron Yelowitz, 1997. "Are Public Housing Projects Good for Kids?," NBER Working Papers 6305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  52. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
  53. Pazner, Elisha A, 1972. "Merit Wants and the Theory of Taxation," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 27(4), pages 460-72.
  54. Hoff, Karla & Lyon, Andrew B., 1995. "Non-leaky buckets: Optimal redistributive taxation and agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 365-390, November.
  55. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1995. "Uncertainty, Optimal Taxation and the Direct versus Indirect Tax Controversy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(432), pages 1165-79, September.
  56. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-1351, December.
  57. Blomquist, Suren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1995. " Public Provision of Private Goods as a Redistributive Device in an Optimum Income Tax Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 547-567, December.
  58. Cremer, H. & Gahvari, F., 1996. "On Optimal Taxation of Housing," Papers 96.417, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  59. Hilary W. Hoynes & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2007. "Consumption Reponses to In-Kind Transfers: Evidence from the Introduction of the Food Stamp Program," Working Papers 0711, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
  60. Beth Osborne Daponte & Seth Sanders & Lowell Taylor, 1999. "Why Do Low-Income Households not Use Food Stamps? Evidence from an Experiment," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(3), pages 612-628.
  61. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
  62. Jonathan Gruber & Kosali Simon, 2007. "Crowd-Out Ten Years Later: Have Recent Public Insurance Expansions Crowded Out Private Health Insurance?," NBER Working Papers 12858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  63. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1997. "In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 97-114, January.
  64. Browning, Edgar K, 1977. "The Externality Argument for In-Kind Transfers: Still Unsupported," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 297-99.
  65. Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 7580, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  66. Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-77, October.
  67. Hugo Benitez-Silva & Moshe Buchinsky & John Rust, 2005. "How Large are the Classification Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process?," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  68. Chris Giles & Paul Johnson & Julian McCrae, 1997. "Housing benefit and financial returns to employment for tenants in the social sector," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 49-72, February.
  69. Bearse, P. & Glomm, G. & Janeba, E., 2000. "Why poor countries rely mostly on redistribution in-kind," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 463-481, March.
  70. Gahvari, Firouz, 1994. "In-kind transfers, cash grants and labor supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 495-504, November.
  71. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 2002. " Nonlinear Pricing, Redistribution, and Optimal Tax Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 139-161.
  72. Janet Currie & Aaron S. Yelowitz, 1999. "Health Insurance and Less Skilled Workers," JCPR Working Papers 63, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  73. Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1989. "Public Provision Of Private Goods And The Redistribution Of Income," Papers 36, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  74. Narayana Kocherlakota, 2004. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000729, UCLA Department of Economics.
  75. P. A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1977. "A Model of Social Insurance With Variable Retirement," Working papers 210, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  76. Edgar O. Olsen, 2001. "Housing Programs for Low-Income Households," NBER Working Papers 8208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  77. Hernán Ortiz-Molina & María Penas, 2008. "Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 361-383, April.
  78. Kelman, Steven, 1986. "A Case for In-Kind Transfers," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(01), pages 55-73, April.
  79. Coate, Stephen & Johnson, Stephen & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1994. "Pecuniary redistribution through in-kind programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 19-40, September.
  80. Toumanoff, Peter, 1986. "Exclusion Costs and the In-Kind Transfer," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 443-47.
  81. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2005. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000450, UCLA Department of Economics.
  82. Besley, Timothy, 1988. "A simple model for merit good arguments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 371-383, April.
  83. Thurow, Lester C, 1974. "Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(2), pages 190-195, May.
  84. Slesnick, Daniel T, 1996. "Consumption and Poverty: How Effective Are In-Kind Transfers?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(439), pages 1527-45, November.
  85. repec:fth:prinin:468 is not listed on IDEAS
  86. Leonardo Gasparini & Santiago Pinto, 2005. "Equality of Opportunity and Optimal Cash and In-Kind Policies," CEDLAS, Working Papers 0022, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
  87. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. " Distributional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but not Program Choice or Design," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(2), pages 264-284.
  88. Olsen, Edgar O, 1980. "Pareto-Desirable Redistribution in Kind: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1028-1031, December.
  89. Gahvari, Firouz, 1995. "In-Kind versus Cash Transfers in the Presence of Distortionary Taxes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(1), pages 45-53, January.
  90. Martin Feldstein, 2005. "Rethinking Social Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 1-24, March.
  91. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
  92. Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, 1995. "On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 249-262.
  93. Irwin Garfinkel, 1973. "Is In-Kind Redistribution Efficient," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 320-330.
  94. Jonah B. Gelbach, 2002. "Public Schooling for Young Children and Maternal Labor Supply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 307-322, March.
  95. Smith, James P & Welch, Finis R, 1989. "Black Economic Progress after Myrdal," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 519-564, June.
  96. Fraker, Thomas & Moffitt, Robert, 1988. "The effect of food stamps on labor supply : A bivariate selection model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 25-56, February.
  97. repec:pri:indrel:dsp01z603qx42c is not listed on IDEAS
  98. Reeder, William J., 1985. "The benefits and costs of the section 8 existing housing program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 349-377, April.
  99. Deaton, Angus & Stern, Nicholas, 1986. "Optimally uniform commodity taxes, taste differences and lump-sum grants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 263-266.
  100. Katsura, Harold M. & Romanik, Clare T., 2002. "Ensuring access to essential services : demand-side housing subsidies," Social Protection and Labor Policy and Technical Notes 25536, The World Bank.
  101. David M. Cutler & Jonathan Gruber, 1996. "Does Public Insurance Crowd out Private Insurance?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(2), pages 391-430.
  102. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-377, May.
  103. Murray, Michael P, 1999. "Subsidized and Unsubsidized Housing Stocks 1935 to 1987: Crowding Out and Cointegration," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-124, January.
  104. Browning, Edgar K, 1981. "A Theory of Paternalistic In-Kind Transfers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 579-97, October.
  105. Amy Finkelstein, 2007. "The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(1), pages 1-37.
  106. Aizer, Anna & Currie, Janet, 2004. "Networks or neighborhoods? Correlations in the use of publicly-funded maternity care in California," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2573-2585, December.
  107. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski & Ivan Werning, 2007. "New Dynamic Public Finance: A User's Guide," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006, Volume 21, pages 317-388 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  108. repec:pri:cheawb:kling_mto481 is not listed on IDEAS
  109. Sonstelie, Jon, 1982. "The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 794-808, August.
  110. Sorge, Marco & Zhang, Chendi, 2007. "Credit information quality and corporate debt maturity : theory and evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4239, The World Bank.
  111. Murray, Michael P, 1983. "Subsidized and Unsubsidized Housing Starts: 1961-1977," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(4), pages 590-97, November.
  112. Amacher, Ryan C & Sandler, Todd, 1977. "The Externality Argument for In-Kind Transfers: A Defense," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 293-96.
  113. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "The Externality Argument for In-Kind Transfers: Some Critical Remarks," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 526-44.
  114. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
  115. Schroyen, Fred, 2005. "An alternative way to model merit good arguments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 957-966, June.
  116. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November.
  117. Moffitt, Robert, 1983. "An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 1023-1035, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Economic Logic blog

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:46:y:2008:i:2:p:333-83. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)

or (Michael P. Albert)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.