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Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods

  • Hanming Fang


  • Peter Norman

    (University of North Carolina)

the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under stochastic independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. Our model is an example where there is an efficiency loss from separating revenue and expenditure problems, and is therefore of more general interest for the study of optimal taxation.

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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2008 Meeting Papers with number 1097.

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Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:1097
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Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA

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  40. Blomquist, Suren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1995. " Public Provision of Private Goods as a Redistributive Device in an Optimum Income Tax Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 547-67, December.
  41. Ted Bergstrom & Soren Blomquist, 1994. "Political Economy of Subsidized Day Care," Public Economics 9401001, EconWPA.
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