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A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types

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  • Tilman Borgers
  • Peter Norman

Abstract

We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.
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  • Tilman Borgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000147, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000147
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    File URL: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/pnorman/Research/budgetbalance3.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2022. "Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: Comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    2. Bierbrauer, Felix J., 2011. "Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 553-569.
    3. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2019. "On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 617-644, April.
    4. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.
    5. Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017. "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 35-63.
    6. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2014. "Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 375-408, June.
    7. Groh, Carl-Christian & Reuter, Marco, 2023. "Mechanism design for unequal societies," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-050, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Serkan Kucuksenel, 2012. "Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 83-93, May.
    9. Bartling, Björn & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 186-204.
    10. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2010. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, November.
    11. Tröger, Thomas & Mylovanov, Timofiy, 2012. "Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case," Working Papers 12-14, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    12. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
    13. Daske, Thomas, 2019. "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: "Gamification" and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints 193148, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    14. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2015. "On the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of non-linear utilities," ECON - Working Papers 212, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Aurélie Slechten, 2020. "Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 455-481.
    16. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    17. Rong, Kang, 2014. "Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 187-196.
    18. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe, 2010. "How to allocate Research (and other) Subsidies," Discussion Papers 1517, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    19. Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2011. "Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 503-512, March.
    20. Jin Xi & Haitian Xie, 2021. "Strength in Numbers: Robust Mechanisms for Public Goods with Many Agents," Papers 2101.02423, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
    21. Rohit Lamba, 2022. "Efficiency with(out) intermediation in repeated bilateral trade," Papers 2202.04201, arXiv.org.
    22. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 774-779.
    23. Bierbrauer, Felix J., 2011. "Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 553-569, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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