IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

  • d'Aspremont, Claude
  • Cremer, Jacques
  • Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre

We present a new condition on beliefs that guarantee the Bayesian implementability of all efficient social decision rules. We show that this condition is easy to verify and is both more interpretable and more general than the conditions that are found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 115 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 385-396

in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:115:y:2004:i:2:p:385-396
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Michael H. Riordan, 1983. "Contracting in an Idiosyncratic Market," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 338-350, Autumn.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
  3. Bhattacharya, S. & Glazer, J. & Sappington, D., 1991. "Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures," Papers 9120, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  4. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 142-151, March.
  5. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
  6. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP 902, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP 354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  9. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June.
  10. Jacques Cremer & Michael H. Riordan, 1987. "On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 436-451, Autumn.
  11. Chung, Kim-Sau, 1999. "A Note on Matsushima's Regularity Condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 429-433, August.
  12. d'Aspremont, C. & Gerard-Varet, L. -A., 1982. "Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 83-103, June.
  13. Walker, Mark, 1980. "On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1521-40, September.
  14. Forges, Françoise & Mertens, Jean-François & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5454, Paris Dauphine University.
  15. Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July.
  16. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  17. Forges, Françoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/169, Paris Dauphine University.
  18. Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 83-93, January.
  19. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  20. Cremer, Jacques, & Riordan, Michael H, 1985. "A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 77-84, January.
  21. d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," CORE Discussion Papers 2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  22. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  23. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  24. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:115:y:2004:i:2:p:385-396. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.