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Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

Author

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  • d'ASPREMONT, Claude
  • CRÉMER, Jacques
  • GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André

Abstract

We present a new condition on beliefs that guarantee the Bayesian implementability of all efficient social decision rules. We show that this condition is easy to verify and is both more interpretable and more general than the conditions that are found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2002. "Balanced Bayesian mechanisms," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2002048
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    Cited by:

    1. Serkan Kucuksenel, 2012. "Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 83-93, May.
    2. Obara Ichiro, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
    3. Guo, Huiyi, 2019. "Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 76-105.
    4. Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019. "Optimal crowdfunding design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    5. Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 118-141.
    6. Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2009. "A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 477-489, June.
    7. Kosenok, Grigory & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 126-161, May.
    8. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Delayed Verification Mechanism for Dynamic Implementation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2014_11, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    9. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Mechanism Design," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Guo, Huiyi, 2024. "Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 263-284.

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