IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations

  • Johnson, Scott
  • Miller, Nolan

    (Harvard U)

  • Pratt, John W.

    (Harvard U)

  • Zeckhauser, Richard

    (Harvard U)

We consider mechanism design in social choice problems in which agents’ types are continuous, multidimensional, and mutually payoff-relevant, and there are three or more agents. If the center receives a signal that is stochastically related to the agents’ types and direct returns are bounded, then for any decision rule there is a balanced transfer function that ensures that any strategy that is not arbitrarily close to truthful is dominated by one that is. If direct returns are continuous as well, truthful revelation becomes an -dominant strategy, all Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies are nearly truthful, and at least one such strategy exists. If the center’s information is not informative but agents’ types are stochastically related, then there exist balanced transfers under which truthful revelation is a Bayesian -equilibrium, again for any decision rule. Analogous results hold for decentralized decision problems when agents also take mutually payoff-relevant actions in advance of any action by the center.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP03-020/$File/rwp03_020_miller_zeckhauser.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP03-020/$File/rwp03_020_miller_zeckhauser.pdf [302 Found]--> http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/Index.aspx). If this is indeed the case, please notify ()


Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government in its series Working Paper Series with number rwp03-020.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp03-020
Contact details of provider: Postal: 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
Fax: 617-496-2554
Web page: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working_papers/index.htm

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June.
  2. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  3. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  4. Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July.
  5. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  6. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  7. d'Aspremont, C. & Gerard-Varet, L. -A., 1982. "Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 83-103, June.
  8. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 809-827.
  9. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 142-151, March.
  10. Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  11. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: an overview," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  13. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May.
  14. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -902, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  16. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp03-020. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.