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Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method

  • Nolan Miller

    ()

    (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138)

  • Paul Resnick

    ()

    (School of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1092)

  • Richard Zeckhauser

    ()

    (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138)

Many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities, products, and vendors. A scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback. Each rater merely reports a signal, and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater's report. Honest reporting proves to be a Nash equilibrium. The scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals. We also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0379
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Article provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.

Volume (Year): 51 (2005)
Issue (Month): 9 (September)
Pages: 1359-1373

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Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:51:y:2005:i:9:p:1359-1373
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  1. repec:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:43-62 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Selten, Reinhard, 1996. "Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule," Discussion Paper Serie B 390, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Robert G. Nelson & David A. Bessler, 1989. "Subjective Probabilities and Scoring Rules: Experimental Evidence," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(2), pages 363-369.
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  6. Robert F. Nau, 1985. "Should Scoring Rules be "Effective"?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 527-535, May.
  7. Daniel Friedman, 1983. "Effective Scoring Rules for Probabilistic Forecasts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 447-454, April.
  8. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "The strategy of professional forecasting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 441-466, August.
  9. Robert Clemen, 2002. "Incentive contrats and strictly proper scoring rules," TEST- An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 11(1), pages 167-189, June.
  10. Paul Resnick & Christopher Avery & Richard Zeckhauser, 1999. "The Market for Evaluations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 564-584, June.
  11. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  12. R. Winkler & Javier Muñoz & José Cervera & José Bernardo & Gail Blattenberger & Joseph Kadane & Dennis Lindley & Allan Murphy & Robert Oliver & David Ríos-Insua, 1996. "Scoring rules and the evaluation of probabilities," TEST- An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 5(1), pages 1-60, June.
  13. Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July.
  14. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
  15. Johnson, Scott & Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John W. & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp03-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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