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An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms

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  • Lambert, Nicolas S.
  • Langford, John
  • Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer
  • Chen, Yiling
  • Reeves, Daniel M.
  • Shoham, Yoav
  • Pennock, David M.

Abstract

We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event probabilities, as well as the mean, median, and other statistics from a group of individuals whose beliefs are immutable to the actions of others. We show how our mechanism, called the Brier betting mechanism, arises naturally from a modified parimutuel betting market. We prove that it is essentially the unique wagering mechanism that is anonymous, proportional, sybilproof, and homogeneous. While the Brier betting mechanism is designed for individuals with immutable beliefs, we find that it continues to perform well even for Bayesian individuals who learn from the actions of others.

Suggested Citation

  • Lambert, Nicolas S. & Langford, John & Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer & Chen, Yiling & Reeves, Daniel M. & Shoham, Yoav & Pennock, David M., 2015. "An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 389-416.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:156:y:2015:i:c:p:389-416
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.012
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    Cited by:

    1. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Tardos, Éva, 2015. "Introduction to computer science and economic theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-13.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Betting market; Wagering mechanism; Parimutuel betting; Scoring rule; Belief elicitation; Prediction market;

    JEL classification:

    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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