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Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information

Listed author(s):
  • Frederic Koessler
  • Charles Noussair
  • Anthony Ziegelmeyer

    ()

This paper examines simple parimutuel betting games under asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between markets in which bets are submitted simultaneously versus sequentially. In the simultaneous parimutuel betting market, all (symmetric and asymmetric) Bayesian-Nash equilibria are generically characterized as a function of the number of bettors and the quality of their private information. There always exists a separating equilibrium, in which all bettors follow their private signals. This equilibrium is unique if the number of bettors is sufficiently large. In the sequential framework, earlier bets have information externalities, because they may reveal private information of bettors. They also have payoff externalities, because they affect the betting odds. One effect of these externalities is that the separating equilibrium disappears if the number of betting periods is sufficiently large.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2006-05.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2006-05
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  1. Frederic Koessler & Charles Noussair & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2006. "Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-05, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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  4. Frédéric Koessler & Charles Noussair & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2012. "Information Aggregation and Beliefs in Experimental Parimutuel Betting Markets," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754582, HAL.
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  11. Frédéric Koessler & Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Marie-Hélène Broihanne, 2003. "The Favorite-Longshot Bias in Sequential Parimutuel Betting with Non-Expected Utility Players," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 231-248, May.
  12. Takahiro, Watanabe, 1997. "A parimutuel system with two horses and a continuum of bettors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 85-100, August.
  13. Brunnermeier, Markus K., 2001. "Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198296980.
  14. Terrell, Dek & Farmer, Amy, 1996. "Optimal Betting and Efficiency in Parimutuel Betting Markets with Information Costs," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 846-868, July.
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  21. Watanabe, Takahiro & Nonoyama, Hideyuki & Mori, Masao, 1994. "A Model of a General Parimutuel System: Characterizations and Equilibrium Selection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(3), pages 237-260.
  22. Hurley, William & McDonough, Lawrence, 1995. "A Note on the Hayek Hypothesis and the Favorite-Longshot Bias in Parimutuel Betting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 949-955, September.
  23. Eddie Dekel & Michele Piccione, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Simultaneous and Sequential Binary Elections," Discussion Papers 1206, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
  25. Frederic Koessler & Ch. Noussair & A. Ziegelmeyer, 2005. "Individual Behavior and Beliefs in Experimental Parimutuel Betting Markets," THEMA Working Papers 2005-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  26. Plott, Charles R. & Wit, J. & Yang, W. C., 1997. "Parimutuel Betting Markets as Information Aggregation Devises: Experimental Results," Working Papers 986, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  27. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Marie-HÈlËne Broihanne & FrÈdÈric Koessler, 2004. "Sequential Parimutuel Betting in the Laboratory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 165-186, 03.
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