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Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

  • Miller, Nolan H.
  • Pratt, John W.
  • Zeckhauser, Richard J.
  • Johnson, Scott

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ?-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures balanced transfers exist that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful. This paper extends the analysis of KSG RWP03-020.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 136 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 476-496

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:476-496
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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