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Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey

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This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.

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File URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp2000-22.pdf
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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2000-22.

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Date of creation: 2000
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-22
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Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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