Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information
We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.
|Date of creation:||08 Sep 1998|
|Date of revision:||15 Sep 1999|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Game Theory 29, 63--79 (2000)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel|
Web page: http://volij.co.il/
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