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Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information

Author

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  • Oscar Volij

    () (Economics Department, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912-B, USA Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905, Israel)

Abstract

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Oscar Volij, 2000. "Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 63-79.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:63-79 Note: Received: September 1998/revised version: June 1999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 148-165.
    4. Stefan KRASA, 1997. "Efficiency with Incomplete Information," Vienna Economics Papers vie9707, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    5. Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman, 2004. "Market Crashes without External Shocks," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(1), pages 1-8, January.
    6. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    7. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 123-147.
    8. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    9. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 185-187.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
    2. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 117-137.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 148-165.
    4. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
    5. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 179-188.
    6. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 262-270, October.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5454 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
    9. Ulrich Schwalbe, 1999. "The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 155-185.
    10. Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September.
    11. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1165-1190.
    12. Askoura, Y., 2015. "An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 38-45.
    13. repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1057-5 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; core; common knowledge;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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